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Abstract 
National and international migration laws determine the legal or illegal status of a migrant. For any 
given legislation the number of illegal migrants depends on the social-political and economic 
conditions of the sending countries and on the organizations which favour frontier transit, but also on 
push-pull forces in the host countries.  
This note elaborates on why employers decide to use irregular workers – be they locals or foreign 
nationals; why workers decide to reside illegally in another country; why institutions enforce the law; 
and last but not least how society pushes institutional action or enforces legislation directly. Without 
social enforcement it is very costly to institutionally enforce a law which limits employment and 
income access to legal workers in societies where irregular employment is common practice. 
For SEM countries the relationship with neighboring sending countries is crucial in reducing the 
pressure of irregular inflows: political contacts, bilateral agreements, operational cooperation, 
development programs etc are legal instrument that can staunch the illegal flows and the same 
instruments are used by the EU with regards to its neighbors.  
Résumé 
Le statut légal ou illégal du migrant est défini par le droit national et international. Pour une législation 
donnée, le nombre de présences illégales dépend des conditions sociopolitiques et économiques des 
pays de départ et des organisations qui favorisent le transit et le franchissement des frontières mais 
aussi des facteurs attractifs et répulsifs des pays d'accueil. 
Cette note se veut de savoir : Pourquoi les employeurs décident de faire appel aux migrants 
irréguliers, qu'ils soient parmi les nationaux ou les étrangers ?  Pourquoi les travailleurs décident-ils de 
résider illégalement dans un autre pays? Pourquoi les institutions appliquent-elles la loi? Et enfin, mais 
pas de moindre importance, comment la société accompagne l'action de l'institution dans l’application 
directe de la législation?  
Sans l'adhésion et l'implication sociétale, il est coûteux d'appliquer une loi qui limite l'emploi et 
l'accès au revenu aux travailleurs légaux dans des sociétés où l'emploi illégal est une 
pratique courante. 
Pour les pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée (SEM) la relation avec les pays voisins de 
départ est déterminante dans la réduction des flux des migrants irréguliers : les contacts politiques, les 
accords bilatéraux, la coopération opérationnelle, les programmes de développement, etc. sont autant 
d’instruments légaux de pression pour réduire les flux illégaux de migrants. C’est d’ailleurs ces 
mêmes instruments qui sont utilisés par l’UE avec les pays voisins. 
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Introduction  
National and international migration laws determine the legal or illegal status of a migrant. 
Changes in the law can change the status of a person. In Jordan, Libya and Egypt law changes have 
transformed flows of legal emigrants from, respectively Egypt to Jordan (2007 MOU), from Sub-
Saharan African to Libya (visa requirement in 2007), and from Sudan to Egypt (visa requirement in 
1995), into illegal flows, while the entrance of Romania into the EU legalized many illegal Romanian 
immigrants in Southern European countries. Legislation is, however, not the only determinant of the 
legal or illegal status of a foreign national. For any given legislation the number of illegal presences 
depends, of course, on the social-political and economic conditions of the sending countries and on the 
organizations which favour frontier transit but not only. There are also additional push-pull forces in 
the host countries.  
The following note will look particularly at those economic forces in the host country which 
condition the size of irregular labor (not entrance) and which depend upon the behavior of four main 
actors: employers, workers, institutions and society. 
The interests of these four actors determine the propensity to comply with the law and thus the 
acceptability of irregular work. 
More precisely, this note elaborates on why employers decide to use irregular workers – be they 
locals or foreign nationals – and asks whether employers have an immediate benefit; why workers 
decide to reside illegally in another country and whether illegality abroad is better than legality at 
home; why institutions enforce the law and whether it is in their direct interests to do so; and last but 
not least how society pushes institutional action or enforces legislation directly. 
1. Employer decision 
Let us analyze, first, whether the employer has an incentive to hire a worker irregularly. The employer 
hires workers as long as benefit outweighs cost, that is while the gross wage (W) is equal to the value 
of worker productivity (p . The gross wage is made up of two parts: social security contribution ( c ) 
and what the worker earns (w). In many countries the worker has to pay income tax (t) on what he/she 
earns, a tax which is proportional to the amount earned and to the type of employment undertaken. 
W= c+w= p  
What the worker carries home is then W-t-c=V. 
If productivity is constant because, say, we are in a technologically simple sector: for example, 
areas of agricultural production and family services1, the employer has an interest in paying the 
workers just their earnings (V), avoiding social contributions and any income taxes paid by the 
worker. This would mean a saving of about 30% on labor costs (W). 
However, the employer is not only interested in saving money. He or she is also interested in 
worker productivity. Thus, in a non-regulated market, where wages are not set administratively or by 
national agreements with the trade unions – the kind of market that is typical of the SEM region – the 
employer can pay the most productive workers more because the employer will get more from them. 
If, for a given human capital level, productivity increases with wages (efficiency wage), the 
employer faces a different scenario as by paying the worker more, he gets more product. 
                                                     
1 With the exception of Jordan where social contributions are not levied on family businesses. 
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The employer can also replace labour by using more capital-intensive technology with more capital 
and less skilled labour. If the employer has not enough money to invest in labour-saving technology, 
then it is necessary to invest, instead, in more skilled labour, that means higher wages, so as to 
increase labour productivity.  
The choice of the employer is strongly conditioned by the technology prevailing in the sector in 
which he or she is operating. The employer can opt for a different technology mix – more capital or 
more skilled labour or less skilled labour – but being rational, he or she will choose the most 
productive technology in terms of factors of production. 
If the product or service provided is produced with a low technology mix, for example in a sector 
like agriculture or family services, where there is little room for technological innovation, the profit 
maximizing employer has the option of using cheap labour. 
In a world where the employment of irregular labour carries with it little or no “stigma” 2 and 
where enforcement is absent or minimal the employer will hire regular workers only if they are more 
productive. After all, regular workers are more expensive and their use is complicated by labour 
legislation which causes rigidity. Firing a worker is more difficult and, over time, more costly. In 
addition occasionally labour laws, to reduce competition between nationals and foreign nationals, 
block the latter’s access to some jobs, hence favouring irregular foreign employment in those jobs.  
If irregular employment prevails in a given sector, say in family services, hiring a foreigner 
irregularly becomes usual and there is no institutional enforcement and no social stigma. 
Both in southern Europe and in south east Mediterranean countries the size of the irregular 
economy is large with much variation inside the countries. In agriculture the concentration of informal 
employment is between 50 and 90%, while in the city centers it goes down to 20-40%.  
Social stigma and enforcement are very limited in rural areas, while they are more important in the 
urban ones. 
When institutional enforcement, instead, exists and is widespread, the benefit of irregular hiring is 
reduced by the risk of being caught and by the amount of any resulting fine. 
Where the employer who uses irregular labour is stigmatized, the employer risks being 
discriminated against in the goods market and in the labour market as the best workers refuse to apply 
for jobs. In a world where such a negative stigma is pervasive the employer who hires irregular 
workers loses productivity and market share. 
Nevertheless, illegal migrants are not equal for society. Some groups are appreciated more than 
others for extra-economic reasons (same religion, shared history etc) and the “stigma” of hiring is less 
pronounced as are the consequential discriminatory effects.  
2. Worker decision 
Irregular workers must often work irregularly: they have no choice . They might be refugees waiting 
for status recognition; they might be migrants fleeing poverty; labourers who were not able to 
regularly and legally enter a country; individuals in transit for a final destination, who look for 
occasional income while they finalize their projects; ‘over-stayers’, that is foreign nationals who 
remains in destination countries after the permit (of work or residency) has expired; or even circular 
migrants (e.g. valise migrants in Turkey). 
These workers are unable to bargain either on labour conditions or on the wage that they will get. 
They will receive subsistence wages and no other support, no minimum heath care, housing etc. 
                                                     
2 See Akerloff 1980, Bask Van P.H. 1998, Blume L, 2002. 
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Not all irregular workers are in this situation, for others the decision to work illegally is part of an 
implicit choice, made to maximize their life income. 
They are frequently only aware of the income that they earn and that they consume immediately, 
they do not make any life-cycle calculations. Thus pension and pension contributions are not a part of 
their maximization plan.  
This is, however, a very rational choice. They have temporary migration plans and given that 
pension transferability agreements between countries fail to cover them, they prefer to insure their 
future through savings earned in the here and now. 
The break-even wage is always a little more than what they receive in a regular job, after taking off 
income tax and social contributions. According to labour market characteristics, compensation might 
be much lower, because the reservation wage, namely the wage for which the worker is ready to 
accept a job is very low, sometimes even lower than a subsistence wage.  
However, the environment in which irregular migrants live is crucial in favouring the decision by 
migrants to remain and work in the country irregularly. 
Is the irregular immigrant persecuted by the state? Or are irregular migrants stigmatized by society? 
If working irregularly does not provide a different de facto status, migrants can – be they regular or 
irregular – consume, in the words of economists, the same commodity bundle, the same goods and 
services and the disutility of being irregular is greatly reduced. If the risk of being stopped by the 
police is close to zero, if the migrant has access to some sort of health care and education – either 
because documents are not requested or because emergency health services are open and very 
supportive or because the health system is mainly private and because education is also available to 
illegal children – then illegality increases. 
In the SEM countries irregular migrants find that the opportunities for receiving social protection 
are not evenly distributed. For instance, primary health care in Egypt is available to all persons. 
Instead, in Mauritania and Lebanon irregular migrants do not enjoy any social protection. While in 
Jordan there is free access to public hospitals, but irregular migrants do not take advantage of this for 
fear of detention and expulsion. In Israel, Syria and Jordan children of irregular migrants have access 
to school. In Egypt the right exists, but the demand for a valid residency permit as a precondition for 
enrollment exclude the children of irregular migrants. While in Lebanon admission to public school is 
limited to citizens but, if places are available, foreign children can also be admitted. Given the nature 
of many irregular immigrants in the area, political refugees and transit migrants the lack of social 
protection is only a slight disincentive, which does though worsen their stay. 
But, even more important, if being an irregular migrant carries with it no “social stigma” then 
irregular migrants can circulate freely and illegality increases. 
This could be the explanation for the increase in irregular labour migration in southern European 
countries where social services are universally granted, society tends not to stigmatize and little 
effective enforcement is provided by the state.  
In addition, there are positive sides to irregular employment which play an important role. Irregular 
employment is more flexible in the number of hours worked. It is similar to self employment where 
you can work holidays or do over-time. More importantly, the worker can leave the job and the host 
country not just for limited holidays granted by the contract, but also for 3 months, and then the 
worker can come back and search for the same or another irregular job. 
The rigidity of formal contracts does not satisfy many migrants who would like to work night and 
day for a period and then go back home for, say, the agricultural season. It must also be said that 
irregularity is not always a choice, and the migrant finds him or herself without rights at the mercy of 
an employer and society in the host country. 
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3. Institutional enforcement. 
Frequently countries ratify international agreements or pass a restrictive law without any intention or 
even the capability of implementing them.  
The main reason for the ratification of agreements or the passing of laws has to do more with 
international relations or politics,, that is with issues far from the one defined by the law. Thus there is 
no compelling need to enforce the law immediately and, similarly, it does not matter whether the 
country is capable of doing so or not. 
In addition law enforcement needs “implementing norms”, frequently new institutional bodies or a 
redefinition of the task of an already existing body. And, in all cases, human resources and funding are 
needed, resources and funding which might not be available and that have to be carved out of the 
Governmental budget.  
The amount spent in fighting irregular migration in the USA and in Europe is very high and largely 
ineffective. In Europe it is also very difficult to know how much is spent. But, to give an example, in 
Italy, in 2004, 115 million euros were spent fighting irregular migration, something like 380.000 euros 
per day and the year before the expenditure was 165 million. In 2004 13 million was spent on 
expulsion, and 40 million for the Temporary Residence Centres where illegal migrants are hosted 
(EMN, 2007). 
The institutions involved are many: government, police, labour control institutions, the courts…. 
If the institution itself does not have a specific interest and if there is not the pressure of some 
population group to implement the law, enforcement will be nil, limited or occasional.  
If local administrators are in an electoral campaign and want to be re-elected and the electorate 
wants more control over illegal immigration, more enforcement will take place even if this 
enforcement is not effective in the long run. If a body exists only to enforce a law and thus the money 
its receives and the power it has are derived from its ability to enforce said law, it will enforce the 
policy. Frequently, however, it will enforce the law without passion, concentrating rather on what is 
easiest to pursue and most visible.  
However, this is rarely the case.  
Institutions have many priorities and diverting human and monetary resources from one objective 
to fight illegality will only work if it is rewarding and justifiable. Sometimes these strategies are 
pursued because there is international pressure (e.g. the Libyan-Italian case) and pursuing it provides 
benefits elsewhere, and it is just an exchange of favours as it is frequently named. 
On other occasions the institution pursues illegal migrants in the country because it is easier to get 
results there than in the battle against professional criminals, and the institutions need to show their 
efficiency. However, in general the main push for institutions to pursue illegal migrants is elite protest 
or public protest. This stick though is not sufficient. It is not sufficient because the solution to the 
problem is always complex and costly. A population, for instance, does not want a camp in their area, 
and moving people from one area to another proves difficult. Unfortunately “Pareto” optimum 
solutions3 are rarely available and are expensive. 
The trade off is always difficult and if a problem can be postponed or if there is the chance that it 
will work itself out, then any reckoning will be put off, with the hope that a costly intervention can be 
avoided. 
                                                     
3 A Pareto optimal solution is a solution which increases the well-being of everybody without reducing the well-being of 
anyone. 
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4. Society enforcement 
The gist of a law is not always in line with the prevailing values of a society. The approval of a law 
does not immediately imply that the society complies with the law’s underlying principle.  
If citizens do not consider a law to be in line with their values then they have three options: first, 
they can refuse to support institutional enforcement; second, they can refuse to invest in pushing the 
institution to enforce the law; and last but not least they will not intervene in enforcement.  
Let us give a different example: taxation. While in North European societies complying with such a 
norm is common, it is a consensual issue; in Latin societies compliance is a much less consensual 
issue, and, if the detection of tax evasion is low and the economic incentive to pay taxes is low as well, 
then the incentive to find loopholes to avoid paying taxes becomes a popular activity. 
If society per se does not feel illegality is a problem, it does not cooperate in implementing an 
institutional enforcement. An example of a society where institutional and social enforcement go 
together is Switzerland. Sometimes it is uncertain if irregular migrants worry more about social or 
institutional controls. It is not clear if the “stigma” of illegality is strongest among citizens or among 
institutions. What is certain is that the two go together and reinforce each other.  
When the syntony between the norm and society is loose, society will not cooperate in enforcing 
the norm, frequently protecting illegal behavior or even investing in circumventing the law. 
If the tradition of hiring native workers without contracts is widespread, then society does not 
worry about hiring an illegal foreign national, especially if the type of occupation in which they work 
is not particularly formal – e.g. agriculture, families, in small shops, very small companies – where in 
the production process there is no one dedicated to administrative issues.  
In many European countries hiring an irregular housekeeper is not perceived as being against the 
law because it has been practiced for years, because legal hiring is too complex and too long (in Italy 
frequently two years are needed to bring someone from abroad) and moreover because it is a way of 
helping a needy foreign lady while, at the same time, solving a personal problem. 
If there is not the clear perception of illegal practice, even if an act is, in fact, formally illegal, then 
society will not enforce the law and it will encourage illegality. 
The hiring of an illegal worker in the construction sector is less often perceived as an acceptable 
action because of the high risk of accidents. However, the complexity of the legal hiring procedure for 
temporary occupation sometimes discourages legal contracts. 
If institutional enforcement were strong with high penalties and frequent checks, even if society per 
se did not consider the law appropriate, then society would respect the law because it would be too 
costly to ignore it. If institutions are serious about the enforcement of a law then there is the possibility 
of educating the citizen in appropriate behavior, even if the citizen does not, in principle, wish to 
comply with the norm. 
There are, however, special categories which benefit or suffer because of irregular migrants: the 
entrepreneurs or the workers or the citizens living near irregular migrants. The first has a long tradition 
in lobbying which can be traced in the settlement of immigrants and the cyclical variation in entry 
visas.4 And, in addition, the interest of the employer group produces pressure for legalization to ratify 
well-established irregular employment position and is shown by regulariziation in Southern European 
                                                     
4 See for instance Facchini, Mayda, Misha, Do interest  Groups Affect US Immigration Policy, Centro Studi Dagliano n 256, 
2008, find  strong correlation between temporary work visa and expenditure in lobbing  activities in the USA at industry 
levels. 
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countries5 and by the amnesties in the SEM (in Jordan for Egyptians in 2007; Lebanon 2006, 2007; 
Egypt for Sudaneses 2004). 
However, if other groups feel threatened by illegal migration as citizens compete with foreign 
nationals for the same jobs or because they are deprived of public space or utilities monopolized by 
foreigners, or because of robberies and violence, then some segments of society are openly deprived 
(e.g. Mauritania, Syria) and the solution becomes more complex. Institution usually support the 
strongest groups, which are the groups which have more money or more political power (perhaps 
because of religious ties) or the group which has more votes or a louder voice in public debate. If the 
group under threat is small and weak, then the institutions will be less likely to intervene. Not all 
voices in society are equal and political power listens to protests in a selective way and the conflict in 
society between more control or less control is difficult to solve and risks the direct intervention of 
single groups. 
If the demand for more institutional enforcement is unanswered or is considered unanswered then 
the unsatisfied groups themselves act as enforcers by pushing undesired people away or by directly 
patrolling the public-private spaces. 
The direct replacement of institutional enforcement by social enforcement is risky because an 
action can easily spiral out of control becoming hostile and xenophobic. 
5. Concluding comments and the role of external actors: neighboring countries and the EU 
The direct interests of the main four actors condition the dimensions of illegal employment. The 
demand for irregular labour in the host country increases only if social and institutional enforcement is 
limited. If there is not a pervasive “stigma” against employing irregular workers then the number of 
illegal labour migrants will grow. 
The recent and rapid increase in irregular migration in the SEM region, which has reached a stock 
of irregular labour of about 2-3 million, plus a million and half refugees and an estimated stock of 
200.000 transit refugees (Fargues, 2008) is not attributed only to a pull effect, but also to push effects; 
and thus it is more difficult to manage given the diffusion of irregular employment. If the culture of 
formal jobs and legal labour contracts is not widely present then citizens will continue to make the 
distinction between legal and illegal migrants, but not particularly between irregular and regular 
employment. And the fight against irregular employment become an impossible challenge for the 
destination country. 
For the SEM countries relations with neighboring sending countries is crucial in reducing the 
pressure of irregular inflows: political contacts, bilateral agreements6, operational cooperation, 
development programs etc are the legal instrument to staunch illegal flows and the same instruments 
are employed by the EU with regards to its neighbors. A restrictive immigration policy likely reduces 
legal flows, while it certainly increases illegal inflows, which become potential irregular labour 
inflows. Open-border policies are not viable, but more flexible legal contracts could accommodate 
many forms of temporary migration (e.g.. valise migrants or circular migrants) and easier legal access 
to labour would permit many refugees. 
Lastly and most importantly EU migration policy affects the general scenario. The EU has tried to 
anticipate illegal entrance by extending external border controls to neighboring countries with bilateral 
agreements, which force these neighbors to control illegal transit inflows into their territories. To bring 
about such agreements the EU has to intervene directly and help neighbors in patrolling, in many cases 
                                                     
5 In Italy the first was in 1986, and than 1999, 1995, 1998, 2002; in Spain 185, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001;  in Portugal 1992, 
1995, 2001;  in Greece 1997, 2000. 
6 A positive conditionality approach could be used. 
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funding these activities. But, even more importantly, the EU needs to promote a legal culture and a 
life-expectancy approach among its neighbors. Without social enforcement it is too costly to enforce a 
law institutionally which limits employment and income access to legal workers in societies where 
irregular employment is common practice. 
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